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tended that the fifth amendment be applied strictly in line with its
historical origins or that it be considered a broad principle designed
to take care of unforeseeable judicial abuses is a question that is
particularly pertinent to the use of compulsary blood tests. Although
blood tests may not be very objectionable in themselves, it is possible
that other medical and scientific tests will be developed which might
not be as unobjectionable as blood tests. For this reason, it is
regrettable that the Court has failed to support its decision with ap-
propriate considerations of the policy and scope of the privilege.
ALBERT VICTOR WRAY
Constitutional Law-Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Proceedings
The free press-fair trial controversy has occasioned much pub-
lic discussion on how best to accommodate the conflicting guaran-
ties of the first and sixth amendments in the law enforcement
process without making the latter unworkable. In Sheppard v. Max-
well,' the United States Supreme Court faced the problem squarely
for the ninth time in fifteen years, clarifying again the constitu-
tional requirement of jury impartiality, and encouraging for the
first time a more vigorous use of existing procedural devices to
protect the individual from prejudicial publicity. The murder of
Dr. Sheppard's wife "captivated the attention of the news media in
an unprecedented manner."' Much of the damaging publicity, both
before and during the trial, was the result of leaks to the press by
the police, county officials and the district attorney's office. The
press aired much of the evidence, some of it "doctored," and some
of it never admitted at the trial; publicized petitioner's refusal to
take a lie detector test; criticized the "protective ring" thrown up
by his family; and, when the police investigation appeared to be
uncovering too little, campaigned for an inquest and his eventual
arrest. The three-day televised inquest was held in a gymnasium,
where the coroner received "cheers, hugs and kisses from ladies" in
the audience when he forcibly ejected the petitioner's chief counsel.
At the trial itself, held two weeks before both the judge and the
prosecutor were up for election, newsmen crowded into the court-
'384 U.S. 333 (1966).2 Sheppard v. Mamvell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 40 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd,
346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
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room, disrupting the proceedings, hounding the participants, and
creating a "carnival atmosphere."' Twenty reporters even had seats
inside the bar. The massive publicity, to which the unsequestered
jury was constantly exposed, continued throughout the trial. Mo-
tions for change of venue, continuance, and mistrial were denied.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial was unfair on
the grounds that the trial judge did not fulfill his duty "to protect
Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated
the community," and "to control disruptive influences in the court-
room."
4
Although "trial by newspaper" has been in controversy at least
since the Lindberg kidnapping,' the Supreme Court did not reverse
a case on the basis of prejudicial publicity until 1959,0 and since
then its standards for reversal have never been clear. At the heart
of the difficulty is the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the
precise effect of publicity on a jury ;7 it is thus not surprising that
there has never been a consistent, precise legal definition of the im-
partiality required of a jury,8 or, on the other side of the coin, of
384 U.S. at 358.
'Id. at 363.
See Robbins, The Hauptnman Trial in the Light of English Criminal
Procedure, 21 A.B.A.J. 301 (1935).
' Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
" Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre,
36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 831 (1961) ; Friendly, The Press, in FAIR TRIAL VS.
FRE PRESS 19 (1965); see generally, Comment, "Free Press-Fair Trial"
Revisited: Defendant-Centered Remedies as a Publicity Policy, 33 U. CHi.
L. REv. 512 (1966); "[T]here is no scientific method for measuring the
effect of propaganda on the subconscious mind." Richardson, What Con-
stitutes Prejudicial Publicity in Pending Cases, 54 Ky. L.J. 625, 635 (1966) ;
But see, ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair
Trial & Free Press, Tentative Draft of Standards, Sept. 1966, 80-83 [here-
inafter cited as ABA Project]; Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The
Psychological Effect of Pre-trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be Im-
partial; A Plea for Reform, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 672 (1965).
'The test is: "[W]hether the nature and strength of the opinion formed
are such as in law necessarily . . . raise the presumption of partiality. The
question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact.., the affirmative of
the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows the actual existence of
such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of
partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside." Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1878).
"Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For
the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the
Constitution lays down no particular tests and the procedure is not chained
to any ancient and artificial formula." United States v. Wood, 299 U.S.
123, 145-46 (1936).
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the prejudice sufficient to defeat that impartiality.' Thus, against
the proposition that an accused is innocent until proven guilty by an
impartial jury is weighed the possibility of never empanelling a jury
because the ideally indifferent juror is nowhere to be found."0 A
generally accepted test1 has been a dictum of the Supreme Court
that impartiality is satisfied if a juror says he can put aside his im-
pression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence pre-
sented in court alone. 2 At the same time, however, such an assertion
by a juror is often unreliable where there has been massive pub-
licity,' 3 and the recent case history leading up to Sheppard illustrates
the Court's somewhat confusing efforts to define the standard more
realistically in terms of the prejudice "inherent" in the publicity
itself rather than on the basis of actual prejudice as reflected in
what a juror says.
See notes 13-33 infra and accompanying text.
10 "If the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a pre-
sumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trial under the
conditions of the present day." Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251
(1910); "Trials cannot be held in a vacuum, hermetically sealed against
rumor and report." Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 330, 67
A.2d 497, 511 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
Some courts assert that the jury must be trusted, despite prejudicial
publicity:
A juror is selected as such because he has met the statutory standards
of intelligence, fairness, and integrity required . . . [i]f we assume
that jurors are so quickly forgetful of the duties of censorship as to
stand continually ready to violate their oath on the slightest provoca-
tion, we must inevitably conclude that a trial by jury is a farce and
our government a failure.
State v. Moe, 56 Wash. 2d 111, 115, 351 P.2d 120, 123 (1960). See also
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 1965).
" See, e.g, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 719 (6th Cir. 1965);
Hickock v. Crouse, 334 F.2d 95, 102 (10th Cir. 1964).
"It is not required, however, that jurors be totally ignorant of the
facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and
diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected
to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of
those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some im-
pression or opinion as to the merits of the case . . . to hold that the
mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an im-
possible standard. It is sufficient of the juror can lay aside his impres-
sion or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
"3 "[P]sychological impact requiring such a declaration [that one could
be impartial] before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so
many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be
given little weight." Id. at 728.
1966]
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Applying a test of actual prejudice in Stroble v. California1 4
and United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,'5 the Supreme Court
required that "the burden of showing essential unfairness . . . be
sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable real-
ity."'" The Court set aside a conviction for the first time in 1959,
in Marshall v. United States, 7 even though each juror examined
said he felt no prejudice as a result of reading incriminating ma-
terial; but the Court was exercizing its "supervisory power" over
the federal courts, and no constitutional guidelines were set down.
The constitutional question came up again, however, in the land-
mark case of Irvin v. Dowd,' where for the first time a defendant
succeeded in proving prejudice as a "demonstrable reality" in a
state trial. Irvin is primarily important because the Court used an
examination of the voir dire records for proof of the prejudicial
effect of the publicity: almost ninety per cent of the prospective
jurors had some opinion of the guilt of the petitioner, and eight out
of the final twelve jurors thought he was guilty before trial.'9 Thus,
while a juror's asserted ability to be impartial despite an opinion
was disregarded," almost as unrealistic and unworkable a test of
t, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). Petitioner, who had murdered a child, alleged,
inter alia, that his trial was prejudiced by the press which gave his case top
billing, printed his confession which was released by the prosecution and
later admitted in court, and referred to petitioner in headlines and text as
"were-wolf," "fiend," and "sex-mad killer." Court held he had failed to
prove prejudice and made note of his failure to seek a change of venue.
15351 U.S. 454 (1956). The court pointed out that failure of petitioner's
counsel to make use of all his preemptory challenges, or seek continuance or
change of venue, "while not depositive, is significant." Id. at 463.10 Id. at 462.
1' 360 U.S. 310 (1959). During the trial seven jurors were exposed to
publicity concerning defendant's prior criminal record and allegal activities.
We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character
* . .so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence. The
prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great when that
evidence reaches the jury through news accounts as when it is part
of the prosecution's evidence .... It may indeed be greater for it is
then not tempered by protective procedures.
Id. at 312-13. (Emphasis added.)
18 366 U.S. 717 (1961). Police officials and the prosecution released a
highly publicized statement about defendant's confession which was never
admitted at the trial. Polls indicated that the blanket of publicity from the
press and radio had left a "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice." Id. at
725-27.0 Id. at 727. Some of the jurors also indicated that it would take evi-
dence to remove their opinions, and one said that he could not give the
defendant the benefit of a doubt. Id. at 728.
- See notes 11 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
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actual prejudice-percentages on voir dire-effectively took its
place. A year later, in Beck v. Washington,21 the Court held that the
Teamsters' leader had failed to establish prejudice as a demonstrable
reality22 partially because the percentages on voir dire were not as
high as in Irvin.23 The court abandoned this approach, however, in
Rideau v. Louisiana,24 where a film of the defendant confessing to
the sheriff in jail was broadcast three times on television.25 With-
out examining the voir dire records,26 the Court said that a trial in
the defendant's community "could but be a hollow formality."27 Al-
though it did not articulate a standard of 'probable' or 'inherent'
prejudice, the Court had not required proof of actual prejudice by
showing-through the voir doir records-any "substantial nexus be-
tween the televised 'interview' and petitioner's trial" and for that
reason Justices Clark and Harlan dissented.2" In Turner v. Louisi-
ana,29 however, the Court found "inherent prejudice" in the con-
tinual association during the trial of two principal witnesses with
the jury. And in Estes v. Texas," which raised the question of
televising trials, the Court reversed on the grounds that "at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that
'1369 U.S. 541 (1962).
2 2 1d. at 558.
2" Of fifty-two prospective jurors examined only eight admitted a pre-
conceived notion, and none of the final twelve jurors had any opinion. Other
factors distinguishing Beck from Irvin: long time period between publicity
and the trial (nine and one-half months); publicity was not as intensive,
extensive, or inflamatory; defendant had not challenged for cause any of the
jurors. Id. at 556-57.
24373 U.S. 723 (1963).
The local officials cooperated and participated in the filming of the
confession which itself was admitted later at the trial. Id. at 725.
2" "But we do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a partic-
ularized transcript of the voir dire ... that due process ... required a trial
before ... a community of people who had not seen or heard Rideau's tele-
vised 'interview.'" Id. at 727. Only three of the jurors had seen the film
some two months before the trial. Id. at 725. But each said he had no
opinion, and only five at voir dire felt Rideau could not get a fair trial, while
24 said he could. Id. at 732.27 Id. at 726.
2
'1d. at 729.
2° 379 U.S. 466 (1965). The case did not involve a publicity question.
Two principal witnesses-deputy sheriffs-were in charge of the jury during
the trial, and the court said "it would be blinking reality not to recognize
the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association," even though
there was no proof the trial was ever discussed. Id. at 47320381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due pro-
cess."'
1
It would seem that Rideau, the televised confession case, might
adopt as the constitutional standard of impartiality much the same
test as that laid down in Marshall for federal courts, namely, that
exposure of jurors to damaging publicity, whether admissible or
not at trial, is sufficient without proving any "nexus" 32 through
examination of voir dire records as in Irvin and Beck (the trial of
the teamster's leader). But both federal and state courts have gone
opposite ways on similar facts, either by distinguishing Rideau as a
unique case involving a televised confession and proceeding to com-
pare percentages with Beck or Irving,3 3 or by resting the decision on
either Marshall or Rideau and assuming inherent prejudice.3 4 Thus,
because Rideau (the televised confession), Turner (the jury-witness
association case) and Estes (the televised trial) are distinguishable
as presenting unusual problems not found in the ordinary criminal
trial, there has not been a clear standard of the impartiality required
for a fair trial. Although it had the opportunity, the Court in Shep-
pard did not fully resolve the confusion.
While the Court rested its decision on the reasoning in Rideau,
Turner and Estes, holding that identifiable prejudice need not be
" Id. at 542-43. Among the factors cited as inherently prejudicial: the
possible heightened community pressure on the jurors; their distraction; the
diminished quality of testimony from witnesses who had seen the trial on
television; and finally, the impact on the defendant: "[T]he picture pre-
sented was not one of that judicial serenity and calm to which petitioner
was entitled." Id. at 536.
" Arguably, Rideau stands for more than Marshall, for Rideau involved
pre-trial publicity (perhaps less damaging because of the time factor) of
material that was admissible at the trial.
" See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1965) where the
Court rested the decision on Beck, and further distinguished Irvin by saying
that the latter case involved publicity of confession and prior criminal
record, while there was only accusation by "innuendo" in Sheppard. Id. at
719. See also United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.
1963); United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963); Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1962); and State v. Van Duyne, 43
N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964). The latter four cases arose before Rideau,
but the courts could have rested the decisions on Marshall, as Massachusetts
did. See note 34 infra.
"Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964) (Rideau);
Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963) (Mar-
shall). See generally, Comment, The Impartial Jury-Twentieth Century
Dilemma: Some Solutions to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial,
51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 308-13 (1966).
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
shown as a demonstrable reality,3  it was referring to the "totality
of the circumstances." 6 Conceivably the Court could have reversed
on the question of prejudicial publicity alone. It then would have
enunciated a clear standard of "inherent" prejudice because Shep-
pard, apart from the sheer volume of the publicity, was not an extra-
ordinary case, and not as distinguishable as Rideau, Turner and
Estes. But despite its characterization of the publicity as "inherent-
ly prejudicial"37 and its disregard of the voir dire records, the Court
reversed on the basis of both the publicity and the bedlam in the
courtroom, and made clear their interdependency:
While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by
the Judge's refusal to take precautions against the influence of
pre-trial publicity alone, the Court's later rulings must be con-
sidered against the setting in which the trial was held. In light of
this background, we believe that the arrangements made by the
Judge with the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of
that "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled."38
Finally, the list of protective procedures available to the judge that
would have been "sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial"39
encompassed both the bedlam and the publicity aspects of the trial.40
Because of the carnival atmosphere of the trial, probably Sheppard,
too, can be distinguished from the ordinary case, and there is no
indication that either Irvin or Beck, where the voir dire records
were examined, has been discredited.
In view of the Court's recent decision in Miranda v. Arizona,41
indeed, in view of all the Court's rulings in the area of criminal
procedure in recent years, one might have expected a clear standard
in Sheppard, particularly since the Court had a model case to decide.
The reason for the lack of clarification may be that the publicity,
though voluminous, did not involve what in the past has been con-
sidered really damaging matter, such as confessions or prior crimi-
nal records, but more "surmise, conjecture and accusation. '42  If
35384 U.S. at 352-53.
"Id. at 352.
, See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
' 384 U.S. at 354-55. (Emphasis added.)
"Id. at 358. These procedures will be analyzed below. See notes 47-61
infra and accompanying text.40 384 U.S. at 358-63.
41384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 720 (10th Cir. 1965). It could
be argued, however, that refusal to take a lie detector test is as damaging as
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the standard were based on the nature of the publicity in Sheppard,
it might make the administration of criminal justice extremely cum-
bersome and unwieldy, if not impossible in some cases, because con-
tinuance, change of venue, or mistrial would arguably have to be
granted at nearly every publicized trial to avoid reversal.43 It might,
further, be quite possible for the press alone, without depending on
the police, witnesses and counsel for information on confessions or
prior records, to trigger almost automatic mistrial or reversal by
printing prejudicial matter uncovered by a reporter's own investiga-
tion.44 Thus, it is clear that for reversal, actual prejudice may not
have to be proved, but the Court will require publicity of a more in-
criminating nature than that found in Sheppard. Such a flexible
case by case approach is sensible in this area where so little is
known about effect of publicity, where other constitutional guaran-
ties are at stake, and where protection of the public as well as fair
treatment of the accused is required.
For whatever reason, the number of cases appealed on the basis
of prejudicial publicity has increased, 45 and the Court recognized
that "reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. '46  The
Court's suggested measures encompass both a more liberal use of
existing protective procedures, and the use of court power to shut
off the sources of prejudicial information to the press. The former
requires a brief examination because of its shortcomings; the latter,
while potentially far more effective, must be seen in the light of the
free speech issue it raises. A completely free press will almost in-
evitably endanger the ideal impartiality required by the sixth amend-
a confession. For a general analysis of what types of publicity are most
damaging, see ABA Project 39-50.
"See notes 47-61 infra and accompanying text.
"See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 n.13 (1966).
"Id. at 362. The increase can be a result either of more liberal court
attitudes, or a more sensational press. For the view that the press is devot-
ing a disproportionate share of coverage to crime, see Mueller, Problems
Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
18 (1961); for a view that the press is becoming more responsible, see
Friendly, supra note 7, at 20. The American Bar Association's Advisory
Committee on Free Press and Fair Trial concluded that though the per-
centage of cases threatened by publicity is small, the actual number is "un-
doubtedly very great." ABA Project 33. But the committee also saw an
"impressive increase in the exercise of responsible restraint on the part of
many news media organizations." Id. at 93.
" 384 U.S. at 363.
[Vol. 45
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ment. Those two values must be balanced, with as little sacrifice of
either as possible.
The most common of the procedural devices available to counter
the effects of pre-trial publicity are voir dire examinations, pre-
emptory challenges and challenges for cause, continuance, and
change of venue or venire 7 Their application, however, has been
troublesome and inconsisten s for a number of reasons, the primary
one being the uncertain standard of impartiality. 9 Motions for
continuance and venue, for instance, are largely dependent on the
voir dire examination,"0 which is "grossly ineffective" as a screen-
ing device. 1 Despite the Supreme Court's implicit recognition of
this fact since Rideau, voir dire will continue to serve as a weather
vane. Even where prejudice is indicated, venue and continuance
are rarely granted, 2 and since they are within the trial judge's dis-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-86 (Supp. 1965) provides for choosing jurors
from another district.
"Comment, Free Press-Fair Trial Revisited: Defendant-Centered
Remedies as a Publicity Policy, 33 U. Cml. L. REv. 512, 515 (1966).
"See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952) ; State v. Sanders,
313 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1958); State v. Moe, 56 Wash. 2d 111, 351 P.2d
120 (1960). The standards for granting applications for these remedies are
similar to those for allowing challenges for cause. Note, Community Hos-
tility and the Right to An Impartial Jury, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 349, 365(1960). The ABA, however, has recommended that these remedies "not
turn on the results of voir dire," but that they be granted as independent
remedies on the basis of other factors such as special public opinion sur-
veys, if necessary even before the jury is empaneled. ABA Project 14,
153-54. For recommendations dealing with the procedural problems con-
nected with review of denials of these remedies before trial begins, see
Id. at 155.
" Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL.
L. Ruv. 503, 505 (1965). Among the reason for voir dires ineffectiveness:
jurors often lie, consciously or unconsciously; lawyers often use voir dire
more for purposes of indoctrination than examination. Id. at 528; and
lawyers feel that challenging veniremen would irritate those finally selected
to serve as an attack on their integrity. Id. at 505.
52 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Wetzel
v. Mississippi, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188 (1954). A number of other
factors help explain their rare use: a judge's confidence in his own ability
to conduct a fair trial, Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 512, 515 n.23 (1966);
expense, and inconvenience to jurors and witnesses, 44 NEB. L. REv. 614,
616 (1965); delay in already congested dockets, Gelb, Fair Trial and Free
Speech, 31 GEO. WAsH. L. Ruv. 607, 613 (1963); and failure to seek other
remedies, see Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) and United States
v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952). Contra, Delaney v United States,
199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952), where court said failure to seek change of
venue or exhause all challenges did not weaken an appeal based on denial
of continuance.
19661
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cretion, rulings are rarely reversed on appeal." Nor are they al-
ways effective if granted. Venue is no remedy where the publicity
is nationwide or statewide;" continuance is often for too short a
period,55 and if long enough to let publicity be forgotten by jurors,
memories of witnesses may fade as much. At least one court has
said failure to seek these remedies did not prejudice an appeal pre-
cisely because they would not have helped in the particular circum-
stances of that case.58 One court even approved the denial of con-
tinuance partially because the "publicity was of the defendant's own
making" and he was "in no position to complain.
5 7
The Supreme Court in Sheppard urged use of continuance and
change of venue "where there is a reasonable likelihood" a trial will
be endangered, curtailing at the same time the deference to trial
judge discretion by ordering appellate tribunals to make an "indepen-
dent evaluation of the circumstances."5 8 But aside from their short-
comings, there are other considerations militating against their more
liberal use. If the prisoner cannot afford bail, he will remain in
jail throughout the postponement.5 There is in addition, a certain
public interest in having a speedy trial: for effective law enforce-
ment, as a means of "social control," to allay community anxiety,
and, if memories fade, not to deprive the state of its chance to con-
3United States v. Moran, supra note 52; Hart'v. United States, 112
F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1940); State v. Moe, 56 Wash. 2d 111, 351 P.2d 120(1960).
" Venue can be effective when the publicity is local, however, and it
has been called "change of venom." Richardson, What constitutes Pre-trial
Publicity in Pending Cases, 54 Ky. LJ. 625, 634 (1966). The difficulty in
gauging publicity's impact in order to apply these remedies is illustrated by
a poll taken when Alger Hiss sought to remove his trial from New York
to Vermont, which showed feeling running higher against him in Vermont
than in New York where the bulk of the publicity was. Note, 59 YALE L.J.
534, 543 n.48 (1950).
"' Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: The Judge's View, 41 N.D.L. Rv.
14, 17 (1964). But see Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir.
1952), where the court ruled that continuance should have been granted by
the court below until after an election, even though it meant a delay of
several months.
" Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961) (dictum).
" State v. Sanders, 313 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1958) (Defendant stirred
publicity by escaping from jail while his trial for burglary was pending).
r'384 U.S. at 362-63. The ABA has recommended a similar "reasonable
likelihood" standard, ABA Project 13; a showing of "actual prejudice is
not required." Id. at 152.
" Comment, Prejudicial Publicity Versus the Rights of the Accused, 26
LA. L. REv. 818, 826 (1966).
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vict.6° Finally, can a defendant be forced to forego his sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy trial in his own community by a trial judge's
decision sua sponte to postpone or move the trial, or by losing a
chance for reversal because of failure to ask for these remedies?6
For publicity during the trial, cautionary instructions have long
been recognized as virtually useless, 2 yet courts have held them
sufficient protection, even in denying continuance and venue.s The
Supreme Court criticized the general instructions and warnings in
Sheppard," and held it a "fundamental error" to deny most of de-
fense counsel's requests for specific questioning of the jury on what
they had read as the trial progressed.65 The desirability of such
specificity is open to doubt, for it may serve only to remind, or
arouse curiosity;6 and the use of inv camera questioning, lest a juror
be ashamed to admit anything in open court, is disliked by the
jury. The Supreme Court's observation that the trial judge should
have raised the possibility of sequestration sua sponte with coun-
sel,68 however, suggests the Court has little faith in any kind of
warning procedure. Sequestration, on the other hand, would seem
to be a very effective method of isolating the jury; and its use has
"0 Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60
CoLum. L. Rtv. 349, 375 (1960).
" Cf. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952), where
the court said that failure to seek venue-to have the trial removed from
the vicinity of the crime--did not prejudice his appeal. See generally, Com-
ment, The Impartial Jury-Twentieth Century Dilemma: Some Solutions
to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial, 51 CORELL L.Q. 306,
315 (1966).
0
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury... all practicing lawyers know to be an unmitigated
fiction." J. Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 453 (1949), as quoted in Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112
(1st Cir. 1952).
"E.g., State v. Moe, 56 Wash. 2d 111, 351 P.2d 120 (1960). This in-
struction of the lower court was approved: "Keep open minds throughout
the trial, and, if anything appears in the newspapers regarding this case or
any of the participants do not read it." Id. at 112, 351 P.2d at 121 (Empha-
sis added.)
' 384 U.S. at 353.
"Id. at 357.
00 Cf. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), "[E]very
time Defense Counsel asked a prospective juror whether he had heard a
radio broadcast to the effect that his client has confessed to this crime or
that he had been guilty of similar crimes, he would by that act be driving
just one more nail into James' coffin." Id. at 916.
' Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Expirical Study, 38 So. CAL.
L. REv. 503, 528 (1965). The ABA, howveer, has recommended examining
each individual juror privately. ABA Project 20.68 384 U.S. at 363.
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been held not an abuse of discretion, where it seemed necessary, de-
spite the objections of the defense that it had a coercive effect on
the jury." But it has drawbacks: it is expensive, and its use would
seem unwarranted where the trial is proceeding without publicity.
If an unsequestered jury were suddenly exposed to unexpected pub-
licity, sequestration would then be somewhat useless. There is al-
ways the remedy of mistrial 0 for such a situation, but that seems
much like reversal-more a "palliative" than a "cure."
Because these procedures can be inconvenient, time-consuming,
expensive and ineffective in many circumstances, it is not surprising
that the Court in Sheppard made further suggestions for controlling
"the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police
officers, witnesses, and counsel for both sides."'" While control of
this kind may involve a limitation on the freedom of speech, there
have been many other proposals,72 some far less sensitive to First
Amendment rights. In North Carolina, for instance, the recent
ruling set down by the Wake County Superior Court restricts the
sources of information to the press much more severely than Shep-
" United States v. Holavachka, 314 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1963). See also
Coopedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1959), for view
that sequestration should not be utilized unless there are exceptional cir-
cumstances. The ABA has recommended that the trial judge in explaining
the use of sequestration not disclose to the jury who requested it, so that
neither side will be disadvantaged. ABA Project 168.
" This remedy was also suggested by the Court, 384 U.S. at 363.
Id. at 359.
Some of these proposals include: (1) use of blue ribbon juries, or
propaganda or psychological testing of jurors (E.g., Comment, The Conflict
Between Free Press and Fair Trial, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 306, 325, (1966));
(2) waiver of jury trial (E.g., Golfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials
and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 810, 831-32 (1961); see also
Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950)); (3) broad regulations similar to the English
contempt power. (E.g., C. Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study
of Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, 56 P. CRIm. L., C. & P.S.
158 (1965); McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for
Reform, 17 HASTING L.J. 79 (1965); Comment, Contempt by Publication,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 531 (1965)); (4) automatic use of continuance, venue,
mistrial and other remedies when certain levels of publicity, both qualitative
and quantitative, have been reached. (Comment, "Free Press-Fair Trial"
Revisited: Defendant-Centered Remedies as a Publicity Policy, 33 U. Cnl.
L. REV. 512, 523 (1966)) ; (5) statutes making it a criminal offense to pub-
lish certain material at certain times, a proposal that would avoid the sum-
mary nature of contempt. (E.g., L. Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 504, 522 (1965); see Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 512 (1966) for
criticism); (6) voluntary cooperation between bar and press. (E.g., Rich-
ardson, What Constitutes Prejudicial Publicity in Pending Cases, 54 Ky.
L.J. 625, 640-41 (1966)).
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pard contemplated.7" It will perhaps be easier to evaluate the Su-
preme Court's reasoning, the Wake Court ruling and the other
constitutional questions involved in light of the most extreme pro-
posal, that of adoption of the English use of contempt of court
against the press, particularly since the Court expressly leaves the
contempt possibility open in Shepard.'4
Briefly, an article cited for contempt in England need not have
actually perverted the administration of justice; "it is sufficient if
it is proved that the article has a tendency to do so,""7 in relation
to any case pending. Examples of material cited for contempt in-
clude publicity relating to the conduct and character of the defen-
dant which would be inadmissible at the trial; confessions, whether
admitted or not; prior convictions; characterization of the accused
as a "vampire"; evidence independently uncovered by a newspaper
bearing on the guilt of the accused; the photograph of a person
charged with a criminal offense where identity was a crucial issue;
comment or opinion concluding guilt; and even the mere arrange-
ment of news which implies guilt. 6 The result is a "wall of silence
around the accused,"7 7 to preclude prejudicing the public and jury
or adversely affecting the testimony of witnesses78 and to protect
the "exclusive sovereignty of the judicial trial itself" from any
competing effort to "canvass the merits in another forum. ' 79 Yet
breaches of the rule do occur, and one of the anamolies of the sys-
tem is that even where contempt is found, the material cited does
not provide ground for reversal. s Recent cases have used the power
"Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 13, 1966 p. 1, col. 1.
", "We conclude that these procedures would have been sufficient to
guarantee Sheppard a fair trial and so do not consider what sanctions might
be available against a recalcitrant press .... ." 384 U.S. at 358.
' Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court it English Law, 48
HARv. L. REv. 885, 890 (1935). See generally, Cowen, The Law: British
and Americair, in FAIR TRIAL vs. A FREE PRESS 9 (1965); see also Laski,
Procedure for Constructive Contempt in England, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1031
(1928), for criticism of the system from an Englishman's point of view.
"' See cases collected in appendix of dissent of Frankfurter, J., in Mary-
land v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 921 (1950).
7 "L. Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 504, 505 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as L. Jaffe].
"' Comment, Free Speech vs. the Fair Trial in the English and American
Law of Contempt by Publication, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 540, 548 (1950).
79 L. Jaffe 505.
"' Cowen, supra note 75, at 15.
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so broadly and drastically that legislation has been passed to make
available certain statutory defenses.8 '
Such a use of the contempt power will probably never be allowed
here, nor should it be. While the first amendment guarantee of free
speech is not absolute, the Supreme Court in a line of cases begin-
ning with Bridges v. Californias2 has evolved a test requiring a
"clear and present danger" to the administration of justice before
a state can punish for contempt.s In addition, use of the contempt
power, though technically a corrective action, would be similar to
censorship,s" and as such could be considered prior restraint where
the constitutional standards are stricter."5 All of the cases decided,
however, involved only a judge, and the Court has explicitly left the
door open for the use of contempt where there is a jury trial.88
" See Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, C. 65, § 11;
see generally, Cowen, supra note 15, at 14.
-2314 U.S. 252 (1941). See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946). "[T]he only conclusion supported by history is that the un-
qualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to
liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could
be countenanced in an orderly society." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 265 (1941).
" Id. at 261. "The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."
Id. at 263.
The Federal Courts are similarly restrained. Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33 (1941), overruling interpretation of Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat.
487, from which 18 U.S.C.§ 401 (1964) is derived, in Toledo Newspaper Co.
v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). See generally Forer, A Free Press
and a Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800 (1953); Nelles & King, Contempt by
Publication in the United States (pts. 1-2), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 401, 525(1928).
"" "[A]nyone . . . would be as effectively discouraged [if court could
cite for contempt in absence of clear and present danger] as if a deliberate
statutory scheme of censorship had been adopted." Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941).
'" Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see generally Comment, The
Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposals, 57 Nw. U. L.
REv. 217, 228-29 (1962).
"Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). "[W]e need not pause here
to consider the variant factors that would be present in a case involving a
petit jury. Neither Bridges, Pennekanp, nor Harney involved a trial byjury ... [T]he limitations on free speech assume a different proportion
when expression is directed toward a trial as compared to a grand jury
investigation." Id. at 389-90.
Implicit here is the assumption that judges are less affected by publicity:
"The law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be
sensitive to the winds of public opinion. judges are supposed to be men
of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 376 (1947). But there is some disagreement on this point. Compare
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Even though the Court left an opening again in Sheppard,8s it seems
unlikely, in view of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"8 that the
Court will ever resort to such action."9
Nor should the contempt power, or any variation of it, be used
in the United States. The need for an active, critical press becomes
clear when English circumstances are contrasted with ours. Perhaps
the overriding difference, historical in origin, turns on the diverging
concepts of the judiciary. In one view, the Supreme Court since
Bridges is saying that the English concept of the judiciary as "un-
touchable by public opinion," is "inapplicable to our politically
oriented judiciary,"9 in which, far from always representing the
top of their profession, judges are sometimes not even lawyers,91
and where they may take a more "activist," "progressive" role in
the community." To hazard a broad statement, England's society,
as more orderly and homogenous and served perhaps by a better
trained and paid police force, has less of a need for the press to
both criticize and aid the law enforcement process.93 Finally, En-
gland's speedy criminal trials contrast sharply with ours, where wait-
ing months for trial in total silence would be intolerable,94 partic-
ularly if the crime charged has political overtones.
Nelles & King, supra note 83, at 551 (newspaper clamor one of the in-
fluences "least likely to operate upon judges") with Baltimore Radio Show
v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949) (Judges are no more immune
than juries) and the Supreme Court in 1965: "Judges are human beings
also and are subject to the same psychological reaction as laymen .... Our
Judges are high-minded men and women. But it is difficult to remain oblivi-
ous to the pressures that the news media can bring to bear on them both
directly and through the shaping of public opinion." Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 548-49 (1965).
s See note 71 supra.
88376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Comment, "Free Press-Fair Trial" Revisited: Defendant-Centered
Remedies as a Publicity Policy, 33 U. Cnri. L. REv. 512, 520 (1966). See
also the reasoning of the Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350(1966).
L. Jaffe 508.
9' Such was the case in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); see note
86 supra.
" L. Jaffe 509.
"Id. at 512. "It is significant that in many of these cases [documented
instances where the press served to uncover the existence of crime and to
see to it that the wrongdoers were prosecuted], either the crimes were
political in nature or there appeared to be political reasons for failure to
prosecute. The watchdog function performed by the news media is vital to
the health of our society." ABA Project 63.
", Royster, The Free Press and a Fair Trial, 43 N.C.L. Ruv. 364, 369(1965) [hereinafter cited as Royster].
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The need for an unrestrained press in America goes beyond pro-
tecting the accused from "secret trials," judicial criticism generally,
and aiding law enforcement. It can warn of criminals at large, a
function that is crucial where the chase is long, and assure the public
when the wrongdoer is caught. 5 If the investigation and apprehen-
sion processes appear too sluggish, the press can goad the police
force into greater efficiency, a factor which may somewhat justify
the conduct of the newspapers in the Sheppard trial itself." By dis-
semination of news, the press might make possible a swifter appre-
hension of suspects, and draw in voluntary key witnesses as well."
Much of this would not be possible under a contempt rule. Clearly,
then, in any balancing of the first and sixth amendments, restraints
on the press would cause the public and the news media a definite
loss with correspondingly less gain for the accused. But while con-
tempt would go too far, something is needed to right the balance
presently weighted against the accused.
As stated above, the Supreme Court in Sheppard listed a number
of procedures the judge could have used to guarantee a fair trial.
The most important of these, and potentially the most effective for
"righting the balance," is control over the "release of leads, infor-
mation, and gossip to the press."9 The court here is fairly explicit:
More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed ex-
trajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court
official which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal
of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or to take any lie detector
tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the identity
of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief
in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits
of the case.99
To carry this out, the Court urged interpreting Canon 20100 to
"Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 205-06(1963).
" L. Jaffe 512 & n.27.
" In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948).
08 384 U.S. at 359.00 Id. at 361.
100 Canon 20, adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908, reads:
Newspaper Disciussiont of Pending Litigation. Newspaper publica-
tions by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere
with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due ad-
ministration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the
extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the
public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte
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prohibit such statements by lawyers."' To control the police, who
disclosed to the press many clues not put into the record, the Court
"could also have requested the appropriate city and county officials
to promulgate a regulation with respect to dissemination of infor-
mation about the case by their employees. '"102
A number of difficulties suggest themselves. The Court may
have gone too far in seeking to quiet the accused and witnesses;
where the authority to control the defendant comes from, the Court
does not say, except that "effective control of these sources" are
"concededly within the Court's power."'" 3 Prohibiting the accused
from protesting his innocence, even in the midst of a highly pub-
licized trial, may be a violation of his first amendment rights. The
damage he can do to himself-which he should have the right to do
if he desires-does not seem to be enough to deprive him of those
rights.0 4 As a practical matter his attorney will advise him not to
make any statements if prejudice is likely to result.
Disclosure of evidence presents another problem. The Court
cites the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy and its severe criticism of the press in the Sheppard case
for informing the public of evidence as it was being accumulated. 0 5
Yet it is precisely the disclosure of evidence which can assure the
public that the right man has been found or will be, that the police
are doing their best job, and that nothing is being covered up if
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records
and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases, it is bet-
ter to avoid any ex parte statement.
It has never been enforced. Comment, Trial by Newspaper, 33 FORDHAM
L. REv. 61, 73 (1964).
"' Whether this control would ultimately be effected by methods of dis-
barment or contempt is not clear. But presumably, disbarment or disciplinary
proceedings instituted when violations of the Canons of Professional Ethics
occurred was the intent of the Court in State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389,
204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cited by the Supreme Court in Sheppard at 361.
See also Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956), where the Court held
that a lawyer is not the kind of court "officer" summarily punishable by
contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), for conduct not in the presence of
the court. But see the opinion of the justices, Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, note 122 infra.
102 384 U.S. at 362.
103 Id. at 361.
104 (1", for one man, would shudder at the prospect of being charged with
some crime, especially one of moral turpitude, and being condemned to
suffer silence until some distant day when even an acquittal would not be
recompense." Royster 369.
1 o384 U.S. 333, 361 n.15.
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political questions are involved. Certainly the Commission's hint
that the public could or should have been kept completely in the
dark after the assassination of President Kennedy is unrealistic. 06
The Court in Sheppard makes no such assertion, however. Singled
out for censure in Sheppard were disclosure of Sheppard's refusal
to take the lie detector test, dissemination of evidence by the prose-
cutor that was never offered at the trial, and release of clues by the
police that were never put on the record.107 The Court's suggestions
are further limited by the fact that such controls are to be used
when the Court is "advised of the great public interest in the case,
the mass coverage of the press, and the potential prejudicial impact
of publicity."'08 This would seem to leave room for disclosure of
"legitimate' information. It is questionable whether dry, factual
evidence without opinion attached is so much to be feared as in-
criminating material that goes to a central dimension of an accused's
personality or character, for such information apparently tends to
form the kind of belief that refuses to yield.109 Finally, these sug-
gestions are not holding in the case, and are aimed primarily at
"collaboration between counsel and press as to information affecting
the fairness of a criminal trial" which is "not only subject to regula-
tion, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary mea-
sures.""
x0
Subject to the reservations above, quieting the sources of preju-
dicial information is probably the most reasonable step possible to
right the balance as it presently stands. The police and counsel are
the source of the bulk of prejudicial news."' The problem of evi-
dence aside, much of such publicity, including confessions and prior
criminal records, are of little value either in terms of warning or
assuring" 2 the public, or of goading the police into action, partic-
.0. Royster 370.
107 384 U.S. at 360-61.
"
8 Id. at 362. Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion in Sheppard, recently
stated in an interview with the Denver Post that the trial judge was to
control prejudicial publicity "once the court has jurisdiction," not before
arrest. Winston-Salem Journal, Oct. 27, 1966, p. 1, col. 2.
10 Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-
trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be Impartial: A Plea for Reform,
38 So. CAL. L. REv. 672, 678 (1965).
110 384 U.S. at 363.
. Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal JTustice,
50 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1964).
"12 Releasing evidence is one way to assure the public that the "chase"
may soon be over, but where there are a number of crimes attributable to
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ularly where the police are releasing the material.1 3 Their motives,
too, spring more from a desire to get favorable publicity or to in-
fluence the trial than to serve the public." While the public would
be deprived of much food for gossip, and the press, some increases
in circulation, that is a price than can be paid to guarantee as fair a
trial as possible. Problems with enforcement of either Canon 20 or
police regulations could arise if a prejudicial story is not attributed
to any particular person and the newsman refuses to disclose his
source. Some states have statutes giving newsmen an absolute privi-
lege of non-disclosure," 5 but otherwise a newsman has no first
amendment privilege of non-disclosure, if asked to testify by the
Court." 6
The substance of these procedures has already been adopted by
a number of states, bar associations, governmental agencies and the
Department of Justice." 7 The rule recently set down by the Wake
County Superior Court of North Carolina represents an attempt to
follow Sheppard, by subjecting to contempt of court any statement
after arrest by counsel, police, witnesses, or accused concerning any
confession, prior criminal record, results of any tests, evidence,
credibility of any witness, or any opinion as to the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused."' While Judges Mallard and Braswell fol-
lowed quite closely the wording in Sheppard quoted above," 9 the
one person, as in the Boston stranglings, "publishing information which is
most likely to prejudice an accused (e.g., publication of a confession or an
official's belief that the accused is guilty) seems to be the most effective
way to reduce community anxiety." Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. Rav. 512, 521
n.59 (1966). However, if the public has confidence in the police force,
knowledge that an arrest has been made can serve the same purpose.
... L. Jaffe 521. "The predominant view is that the ends of law enforce-
ment would not be seriously impaired by muzzling the law enforcement
authorities." Ibid.
" 'Herbourg, Extracts From a Report of the Special Committee of the
American Bar Association, 1937, 39 A.B.A.J. 981, 1021 (1953); Mueller,
Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 10 (1961).
... See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); Arizona: ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1956); California: CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070;
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965).
..6 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
""E.g., State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964); The
Philadelphia Bar Association, Broadcasting, Jan. 4, 1965, p. 49; Depart-
ment of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1966); See generally periodic publications
by the Freedom Of Information Center, School of Journalism, University
of Missouri.
... Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 13, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
... See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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ruling seems to misinterpret the Supreme Court opinion in three
respects.
In the first place, the Court in Sheppard was not seeking to
make a flat prohibition of virtually all information to the press as
a general rule, but only when publicity threatens a fair trial. Argu-
ably, the Superior Court ruling is practically an abridgment of free
speech and a prior restraint, for it closes off virtually all of the
press' sources. The Supreme Court has recognized that the first
amendment guarantees encompass the dissemination of news after
printing as well as the gathering of it." In light of the desirability
of balancing rights and interests, it is doubtful that a Court, despite
its inherent power to regulate the professional conduct of at-
torneys,121 could thus interfere with free speech, albeit indirectly by
cutting off sources, 122 when there is no real need2' until the threat
120 "[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public." Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Invalidation of a contract under the Sherman Act).
121 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
122 Cf., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, (1958):
In the domain of these indespensable liberties, whether of speech,
press, or association, the decisions of the Court recognize that abridg-
ment of such rights, even though unintended, may inveriably follow
from varied forms of governmental action . . . the governmental
action challanged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected
liberties. Statutes imposing taxes upon rather than prohibiting partic-
ular activity have been struck down when perceived to have the
consequence of unduly curtailing the liberty of freedom of the
press ......
Id. at 461.
But see the Opinion of the Justices, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, 34 U.S.L. WEEKc 2014, 2015, (June 13, 1965) on proposed Mass.
H.B. No. 3991 which would punish either by contempt or as a misdemeanor
any leaks by lawyers to the Press:
The first class are officers of the court, a title not otherwise de-
fined. The term clearly applies to members of the Bar ... including
public officeholders and prosecutors ... as well as ... court officers
and clerks of courts.... We deem it to be free from doubt that those
we have classified as court officers have no right to divulge to news
media information prejudicial to any defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial in a criminal proceeding and the news media have no
reasonable excuse for complaint in this limitation on their sources of
information.
.2. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961):
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been
regarded as the type of law the First or the Fourteenth Amendments
forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been foundjustified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite
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of prejudicial matter actually materializes. 12 4 It is true that there
is no Constitutional 'right to know' as such, but there is perhaps a
"government 'no-right' to interference with the acquisition of in-
formation."'2 It was the Court's intention in Sheppard, in so care-
fully framing its holding, to remain as flexible as possible and to
balance interests as evenly as possible. It is hardly possible that it
also intended a flat prohibition on all release of information; it
would then have been somewhat superfluous to urge more liberal
use of continuance, change of venue, or mistrial.
Secondly, the Wake Superior Court ruling fails to distinguish
between matters that are prejudicial and those that are not, nor
can it, if in effect before the "great public interest in the case, the
mass coverage of the press, and the potential prejudicial impact of
publicity"'126 become apparent. Although the Supreme Court in
Sheppard did not attempt to define what is prejudicial, it recog-
nized the distinction, 2 7 and as we have seen, it would seem to allow
disclosure of legitimate information. 28
Thus, by failing to acknowledge the distinction between pre-
judicial and non-prejudicial matters and by setting up a flat rule of
prohibition, the Wake court order misses the basic premise of flex-
ibility in Sheppard. The practical results could be dangerous. Al-
ready a new term-"evidentiary"-is being used by the police in
refusing to mention skid marks in automobile accidents, type of
weapons, existence of powder burns, or autopsy reports in murder
cases, and the amount of money involved in burglary cases.129
Should the state have a weak case, or should the defendant be false-
ly accused and poorly represented,'80 little could be done to correct
to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the
governmental interest involved.
See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959) : "The
'subordinating interest of the State must be compelling' in order to over-
come the individual constitutional rights at stake."
... See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963): "[A] State may
not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore consti-
tutional rights."
"'M ueller, supra note 114, at 2 n.1.
.2. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 350, 362 (1966).
1' "The trial court might well have proscribed . . . statements ... which
divulged prejudicial matters ... ." Id. at 362. (Emphasis added.)
128 See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
... Winston-Salem Journal and Sentinal, Sept. 25, 1966, § c, p. 3.
12. See criticism of the American Bar Association's Advisory Committee
recommendations by the press, collected in the New York Times, Oct. 9,
1966, § 1, p. 89, and compare Daniel, Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press,
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the situation until the trial, when it might be too late. The accused,
of course, could say nothing. Should a prominent citizen be charged
with a crime, the police now have a convenient excuse to keep his
name out of the news, and even to foreclose any attempt by the
press to uncover favored treatment by police or courts.'81 Failure
to distinguish between prejudicial and non-prejudicial matter may
have its greatest impact, however, on cases dealing with "white col-
lar" crimes in contrast to those involving violence or moral turpi-
tude. There may be a valid distinction here: it is the latter type of
crime that typically arouses public passion, rage or histeria.8 2 White
collar crimes, on the other hand, may result in trials like Estes,
which was characterized as "a most mundane affair, totally lacking
in the lurid and completely emotionless."'88 Since such cases can
often raise political and economic questions of national interest,8 4
71 CASE & COMMENT, no. 5, p. 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1966): "The press in general
will interpose no objection to anything the bar, the bench and the police
may do in the way of disciplining their own people...."
... See Winston-Salem Journal and Sentinal, Sept. 25, 1966, § c, p. 3. See
also note 93 supra.
.. See the reasoning in Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244, 247 (1st Cir.
1961), where the court distinguished Stroble v. California, 341 U.S. 181
(1952) and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1962), among others:
It can certainly be said that the Brink's Robbery excited widespread
public interest and no little general public amazement at the obvious
skill with which it was planned and the dramatically bold and daring
way in which a group of armed and masked men invaded supposedly
impregnable premises and successfully made off with a million two
hundred and nineteen thousand dollars. It cannot be said, however,
that the robbery stirred general feelings of rage and revulsion touch-
ing off widespread public clamor for vengeance on those accused of
perpetrating it, for it was not accompanied by any physical violence
except the disarming ... of the guards on duty.
.
3 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 613-14, (1965) (Dissenting opinion).
"The evidence related solely to the circumstances in which various docu-
ments had been signed and negotiated. It was highly technical, if not down-
right dull." Id. at 614. See also note 109 supra and accompanying text.
...A further distinction may be possible here, between news comment
aimed solely at attacking a judge ("scandalizing the court"), and that which
is mere sensationalism and which has only the effect of prejudicing a jury.
The English courts punish both. See Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt
of Court in English Law, 48 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1928). The difficulty, of
course, is that the two may be quite interwoven, as they were in Sheppard,
where the papers, in their efforts to goad the police into greater efficiency
also screamed for Sheppard's arrest, thereby assuming his guilt. The im-
plication of the Supreme Court's two-legged holding in Sheppard, however,
is that the publicity in that case, if toned down, would not in itself destroy
a fair trial, provided that various protective procedures are used. Thus,
left open is the opportunity to comment on such questions as labor in Beck's
trial, agricultural regulations in Estes's trial, economic policy in the price
fixing cases, or organized crime in tax cases like Al Capone's, without
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it would seem unwarranted to cut off discussion that may not be
prejudicial. By trial time, which may be months after arrest, public
interested in the larger questions may very well have waned.'
Finally, the Wake court apparently misinterprets the Supreme
Court's procedure for effecting a clamp on the sources of informa-
tion. The Wake court will punish unauthorized disclosure by sum-
mary contempt, while it is likely that the Supreme Court intended
that disciplinary proceedings be used.'36 Further the Wake court
subjects the police to the contempt power, while Sheppard merely
suggests that the police officials issue their own regulations when
requested to do so by the trial court judge. 3 7 The report of the
American Bar Association's Advisory Committee on Free Press and
Fair Trial has recommended a similar approach, urging adoption
of their proposed regulations as rules of court, and endorsing the
use of the contempt power in serious cases over lawyers and police
as well.38 There is even a recommended provision for punishing
by contempt a private individual who, knowing a trial by jury is in
progress, disseminates information that goes beyond the public rec-
ord of the court and that is "reasonably calculated" to affect the
outcome of a trial.3 9 But the report would allow news releases
after arrest of evidence seized and weapons used, quotations with-
out comment from public records of the court on the case, and a
statement by defense counsel that his client denies the charges
against him, 4 ' and to that extent avoids one of the major draw-
backs of the Wake court ruling.
running the risk of setting the criminals free. This opportunity is destroyed,
however, by the Wake Court ruling, and would be seriously reduced if
certain provision's of the ABA Advisory Committee's recommendations are
adopted.
. Such a flat prohibition of news gathering could result in two further
problems: an increase in rumors, fanned by the press that is still free to
find out what it can on its own; and the difficulty in deciding whether to
grant automatic mistrial whenever there is any release prohibited by the
court ruling.
... See note 101 supra.
"' See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
.ABA Project 6-9. For discussion on problems of enforcement, and,
in relation to contempt power over police, the constitutional question of
separation of powers, see id. at 121-29.
:13 Id. at 21-22.
1
'
0 Id. at 5, 8, 9. But these provisions seem to be aimed only at crimes of
violence such as murder or burglary and not white collar crimes because of
their reference to evidence siezed, weapons used, and "pursuit" and "re-
sistence." The police provisions further provide that permitted post arrest
releases be withheld if public disclosure would serve no significant law en-
1966]
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If "trial by newspaper" involves not only the conflicting guaran-
ties of the first and sixth amendments, but also the conflict between
the right of the public to be informed and the "equally great right to
be free from detriment through crime,"14' it requires careful han-
dling indeed. Through its flexible holding the Court in Sheppard
has not made the administration of a fair trial or the attainment of
convictions either extremely difficult, or slow; and it has attempted
to preserve as much as possible the traditional freedoms by urging
a more liberal use of existing procedures. Hopefully, where judicial
or political criticism is unnecessary, and the interests of the public
are satisfied, the press will learn "to be content with the task of
reporting the case as it unfold[s] in the courtroom"-not "pieced
together from extra-judicial statements." '142
C. B. GRAY
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Police Interrogation
Miranda v. Arizona' applies the exclusionary rule to statements
taken during police interrogation without compliance with procedural
guarantees designed to implement the fifth amendment2 privilege
against self-incrimination. The rationale of the decision is that in-
forcement function, and, in the situation where no arrest has been made,
the identity of the suspect and details of investigative procedures be with-
held except to assist in the "apprehension of the suspect" or to warn the
public of any "dangers." Id. at 10-11. It is possible to interpret these pro-
visions to allow or actually demand a complete blanket of silence where a
white collar crime is involved, because such a crime rarely poses problems
of "apprehension," "warning the public of dangers" or investigation gen-
erally. See notes 93 & 134 supra.
1,' Mueller, supra note 114.
1,2 384 U.S. at 362. Since mistakes will be made, perhaps waiver of a
jury trial could be encouraged to avoid any further restrictions on the free
flow of information. A defendant, however, cannot waive a jury trial in a
federal court without consent of the government prosecutor and the court
under FED. R. CGRIM. P. 23(a). Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
But in Singer, though prejudicial publicity was not in issue, the Court said
in considering that possibility: "We need not determine in this case . . .
where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are
so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would re-
sult in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial." Id. at 37. For
various state provisions, some of which allow for waiver without consent
of the government, see id. at 36. The ABA recommendations also provide
for waiver of jury trial, if knowingly and voluntarily made and if neces-
sary to increase the likelihood of a fair trial. ABA Project 14.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.C. CoxsT. amend. V.
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